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ABSTRACT
This work details the development of the Critical Phase Analysis Tool
(CPAT), a tool for analyzing and grading the quality of approach and landing
phases of flight for the National General Aviation Flight Information Database
(NGAFID). General Aviation (GA) accounts for the highest accident rates in
Civil Aviation, and the approach and landing phases are when a majority of
these accidents occur. Since GA aircraft typically lack most of the sophisticated
technology that exists within Commercial Aviation, detecting phases of flight
can be di cult. Moreover, because of the high variability in GA operations and
abilities of the pilot, detecting unsafe flight practices is also not trivial. This
thesis details the usefulness of an event-driven approach in analyzing the quality
and risk level of an approach and landing. In particular, the application uses
several parameters from a flight data recorder (FDR) to detect the phases of
flight, detect any safety exceedances during the phases, and assign a
metrics-based grade based on the accrued number of risk levels. The goal of this
work is to improve the post-flight debriefing process for student pilots and
Certified Flight Instructors (CFI) by augmenting the currently limited feedback
with metrics and visualizations. By improving the feedback available to students,
it is believed that it will help to correct unsafe flying habits quicker, which will
also help reduce the GA accident rates in the long-term. The data was collected
from a Garmin G1000 FDR glass cockpit display on a Cessna C172 fleet. The
developed application is able to successfully detect go-arounds, touch-and-goes,
and full-stop landings as either stable or unstable with an accuracy of 98.16%.
The CPAT can be used to provide post-flight statistics and user-friendly graphs
for educational purposes. It is capable of assisting both new and experienced
pilots for the safety of themselves, their organization, and GA as a whole.
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General Aviation (GA) is one of two branches of Civil Aviation, which
pertains to the operation of all non-scheduled and non-military aircraft [3–6].
GA includes fixed-wing airplanes, helicopters (rotorcraft), balloons, dirigibles,
gliders, etc.; and comprises 63% of all Civil Aviation activity within the
U.S. [3, 5, 7]. Performing GA flight analysis is essential for making the GA
community safer, as currently GA has the highest accident rates in Civil
Aviation [6, 8]. As of 2014, the total accident and fatality rates for GA
fixed-wing aircraft were 5.78 and 1.19 per 100,000 flight hours, respectively; and
75.3% of GA accidents were caused by pilot-related actions [6].
The National General Aviation Flight Information Database (NGAFID) has
been developed at the University of North Dakota as a joint
university-industry-FAA initiative that is responsible for the curation,
dissemination, and analysis of flight data for the General Aviation (GA) sector
of Civil Aviation [9, 10]. The objective of the NGAFID is to proactively identify
accident precursors and mitigate risks associated with unsafe flight practices and
aircraft maintenance issues within the GA community. This is achieved via
non-punitive information sharing to educate operators on risks associated with
their flights to encourage safer practices [9]. The analytical tools provided by the
NGAFID are free and available to GA pilots who participate by uploading their
flight data through the NGAFID web application1 or the GAARD mobile
application [11]. Subsequently, their flight data is preprocessed and analyzed
using various queries. Many queries are based on threshold criteria called
exceedances, which are predefined using known limitations of the make/model
1http://www.ngafid.com
1
Figure 1: Screen-shot of a flight which has an excessive roll exceedance. The
exceedance event is highlighted in red.
aircraft or the phase of flight. However, other recent work has focused on
developing more advanced analytics through machine learning and other holistic
techniques [12–18]. Upon logging into the web portal, the user is provided with
summaries of any unsafe events (see Figure 1) and is able to reanimate their
flight(s) using X-Plane2 or Cesium3 (see Figure 2). The intent is to educate
participating pilots on any unsafe practices in their flight and maintenance issues
with the aircraft which may contribute to an accident/incident. The overall goal
of this initiative is to reduce the accident and fatality rates within the GA
community.
Scope & Objectives
The goal of this research is to develop an automated grading system, the Critical
Phase Analysis Tool (CPAT), for analyzing quality of approach and landing




Figure 2: Example of in-browser flight reanimation using Cesium.
variation of GA flight. This application will be useful in several di↵erent areas:
• provide student pilots with a grade/metric that they can use to gauge a
flight’s quality, which helps target di↵erent student learning techniques,
• help improve the flight training process for Certified Flight Instructors
(CFI) by making post-flight evaluation more e cient,
• help reduce costs of training for the student and institution due to a lesser
need for additional training flights, and
• help further reduce GA accident and fatality rates.
Motivation
Despite many safety e↵orts that have been recently introduced to the GA
community, accident rates in the United States remain high. One way of
characterizing flight safety is by identifying exceedances, or events that bring the
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aircraft into an unsafe state dependent on the phase of flight. By detecting these
exceedances, we can identify areas of improvement at the pilot- or
organizational-level and additionally educate the pilots on their unsafe practices.
In particular, this research is mainly focused on this aspect of improving
teaching feedback for Certified Flight Instructors (CFIs) and student pilots
within flight training institutions (although it may be useful to individual private
pilots as a side-e↵ect). Furthermore, the scope of analysis is for the approach
and landing phases of flight since these are some of the most critical phases in
GA as they ranked #6 and #1, respectively, for number of pilot-related accident
types in 2014 [6]. These phases present particular challenges in detection of the
phase and exceedances due to the high variability in GA operations and flight
performance [19–21].
At the time of this writing, the feedback that a student pilot receives for their
flying performance consists of a verbal debriefing given by the student’s CFI.
This process can be prone to errors as both the CFI and student must recall the
flight from memory or utilize any notes they were able to take mid-flight.
Additionally, a cross-country flight may last anywhere from 1.5 to 2 hours, which
can be a lot to recall after they have landed and returned the aircraft. This may
work well for some students, but not for all as many people do not have a great
short-term memory. For these reasons, an automated system that can provide
metrics-based results of their flying performance and allow them to replay their
flight will benefit student pilots by providing another means of obtaining
feedback, which will cater to students who learn more e ciently with visual
materials.
Outline
This thesis is organized with related works in the areas of aircraft operations,
post-flight evaluation tools, NGAFID related work, and data mining techniques
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in Chapter 2. Chapters 3 and 4 are a continuation of previous work presented
in [22]. The approach to phase of flight identification, exceedance detection,
grading, and web interface are discussed in Chapter 3. The implementation;
including the programming languages, libraries, and parallelization techniques
used; are discussed in Chapter 4. Results of the flight analysis are given in
Chapter 5. Finally, there is a conclusion of the research and a discussion of





In Dr. Ed Wischmeyer’s paper, The Myth of the Unstable Approach [23], he
discusses how the term “unstable approach” is now becoming too vague to be
used in accident and incident reports. He argues there are too many factors that
play into an approach; therefore, labeling it solely as an “unstable approach” is
not su cient. This aligns with one of the goals of the Critical Phase Analysis
Tool in that it was developed to detect unstable approaches and be able to state
what the specific parameter was that caused the approach to be unstable. In
doing this, it allows for finer-grained statistics to be generated, which can reveal
further patterns to be detected within an organization if it becomes a
wide-spread problem.
Nazeri et al. [24] researched accident and incident data from several di↵erent
commercial flight data sources in order to discover the factors that cause those
events. They created eight high-level categories, each with sub-factors, for
classification. They used an algorithm to analyze the data for correlations
between di↵erent attribute-value pairs across the accident and incident data sets.
A factor support ratio was calculated for each attribute-value pair and ranked in
decreasing order to find the most significant factors. The following high-level
factors were the four top ranked in order: company, air tra c control, pilot, and
aircraft. They also did a time-series analysis of the data for the ten-year period
in which the data was collected (1995-2004). This time-series data showed the
pilot and aircraft factors are generally decreasing over time, while the air tra c
control factors are generally increasing. By uncovering these patterns and
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analyzing them over time, they were able to find the factors that are leading
causes for accidents/incidents and can address these factors for improvement.
Post-Flight Evaluation Tools
There are several software projects that have created post-flight evaluation tools,
which a pilot can use to analyze their performance during various phases of
flight. Each project has a similar methodology, but varying presentation
techniques. Knighton and Claramunt [25] created a system that included
hardware for collecting real-time flight data and an interactive graphical user
interface (GUI). The GUI is capable of 2D flight re-animation and simple plots
of the aircraft’s vertical profile throughout the flight. The flight re-animation
also has a panel with indicators showing the real-time sensor data at each time
step. They found through experiments, using volunteers, that their interface was
intuitive and encouraged exploration of di↵erent aspects of flight performance.
Despite the usefulness of the flight parameter graphs, the downside to their
research is that any analysis has to be performed manually by the user as there
are no automated analysis results provided.
Masiulionis and Stankunas [26] provide a review of several software packages
for flight analysis including IGC Flight Replay, OziExplorer, GPS TrackMaker,
and ArcGIS. They found that none of the packages provided all the aspects they
sought: interactively enabling/disabling map layers, graphing multiple flight
parameters on a single plot, and high-resolution maps. Thus, they experimented
with flight analysis and visualization using Google Earth. Google Earth met all of
their standards, but the only disadvantage is that the altitude and speed graphs
can become compressed for flights with an extended duration. It does not include
any features to resize or drill-down into the graphs to make them more viewable.
Goblet et al. [19, 20] researched into automatically classifying phases of GA
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flights. The focus is on the climb, cruise, and descent phases as they are the
most di cult phases to identify in GA due to the variation of mission profiles
and purposes of flight when compared to Commercial Aviation. Several methods
were explored for identifying these phases: altitude-based and
smoothing-and-di↵erentiation-based (which includes down-sampling, moving
average, and local regression). It was found the best method to use for a
particular flight is determined by specific characteristics found within that flight.
An algorithm is then given to automatically select the best method for each
flight. Although the climb, cruise, and descent phases are the most di cult to
identify, it is known that the approach, landing, and go-around phases are the
most critical and dangerous in GA (as discussed in Chapter 1), thus is the reason
this work focuses on analysis of those phases.
Fala and Marais [21] developed a method of detecting unsafe aircraft
parameters, termed “safety events”, in GA flights. Similar to phase
identification, detecting safety events in GA is di cult due to the variability in
operations. In their research, they only focus on the approach phase and provide
the numerical parameter limits for a Cirrus SR20 aircraft during the approach
phase. For each parameter, they provide a Level 1 and Level 2 limit stating that
Level 2 is more dangerous than Level 1. They analyzed the approach phases
from a sample of 23 flights using their defined thresholds and performed a
one-way ANOVA analysis to evaluate whether the average number of instances
for each type of safety event was similar. They found their initial threshold
definitions were not similar enough across the parameters. They revised the
definitions, re-analyzed the flights, and performed another ANOVA analysis to
find that they were then significantly similar. When detecting safety events, Fala
and Marais did not distinguish between sporadic exceedances of the thresholds
and a span of consecutive exceedances. This di↵ers from the work in this project,
where an event can span multiple seconds instead of only single time steps.
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NGAFID Related Work
Other work on the NGAFID has focused in two di↵erent areas. In the first,
Desell et al. have examined methods based on the prediction of flight data
parameters using recurrent neural networks (RNNs). They have shown that
training Jordan and Elman RNNs using evolutionary algorithms such as Particle
Swarm Optimization and Di↵erential Evolution can provide strong predictive
results for flight data parameters such as airspeed, altitude, pitch, and roll [17];
and that these results can be further refined utilizing a novel neuroevolution
technique based on ant colony optimization (ACO) to evolve the structure of the
RNNs [14]. Further work by ElSaid et al. has utilized Long Short-Term Memory
(LSTM) RNNs to predict aircraft engine vibration events [15, 16]. They later
found the structure of the network can be optimized using ACO, which
significantly reduces the number of connections required and improves the
predictive ability of the RNN [18].
The other area has been in utilizing unsupervised machine learning methods
to detect anomalous flights. Clachar et al. have used self organizing maps
(SOMs), a type of neural network, to both cluster time series flight data and
identify anomalous flights [12, 13] based on approach phases. The SOMs
provided significant benefits in terms of parallelism and performance over other
clustering methods such as DBSCAN [27].
Data Mining Techniques
Harris et al. [28] of MITRE Corporation mined accident and incident reports
provided by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in order to
determine the specific attributes that were the cause in each kind of report and
also needed to be considered “interesting” (i.e., anything that is an exception to
commonly accepted knowledge among aviation experts) by the aviation expert
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who collaborated with them. They discovered that using traditional data mining
methods was not su cient enough to find “interesting” results. This is because
experts have studied the field of aviation so extensively that all the obvious rules
and correlations have already been discovered. Next, they developed their own
system called Smithers, which uses a technique called attribute focusing, that
finally uncovered an interesting correlation which shows that having an advanced
heads up display (HUD) can help reduce the amount of damage as a result of a
runway incursion1. This shows that even though aviation safety has been studied
extensively, there are still new correlations that can be made when applying
several di↵erent data mining methods.
Matthews et al. [30] performed similar research in which their goal was to find
anomalous data in flights. They di↵er in the fact that they used algorithms that
could analyze at both a fleet-level and flight-level. Doing this allowed them to
find anomalies for an entire organization or just a single flight, which makes it
very useful in order to find patterns of problems. This idea is similar to the
NGAFID project in which flight data can be analyzed on multiple levels while
giving statistics for each.
1Defined by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as, “any occurrence at an aerodome
involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on the protected area of a




The Critical Phase Analysis Tool provides several features: (i) phase of flight
identification, (ii) quality analysis of each phase, (iii) grade assignment, and (iv)
a web interface to display results. Since there are three separate phases of
concern, there will be a separate subsection for each in both identification and
quality analysis. These features are discussed in more detail in the rest of this
Chapter.
Phase of Flight Identification
Approach
The approach phase is defined as the time between the aircraft entering the
airport’s tra c pattern (shown in Figure 3), or 1,000 feet above the runway
elevation, to the beginning of the landing flare under Visual Flight Rules (VFR).
For Instrument Flight Rules (IFR), it is the time from the Initial Approach Fix






Figure 3: Example showing an airport’s tra c pattern and the subphases of the
approach.
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Along with detecting the approach phase (Algorithm 1), this section also
details the algorithms for detecting (i) the airport and runway that the aircraft
is approaching and (ii) the final turn so it can later be analyzed for an
undershoot or overshoot.
The algorithm for detecting an aircraft’s approach needs to iterate through all
of the time values since there can be multiple approaches within a single flight.
Once the algorithm detects the aircraft is 1 mile away from an airport and is less
than 500 feet above ground level (AGL) (Algorithm 1 Line 6), it is determined
that the pilot is beginning an approach and a unique approach identifier is
generated in order to store metadata later in the process. Next, the algorithm
continues to iterate through time values until either the aircraft goes under 200
ft AGL, or it goes back above 500 ft AGL, which will then be recorded as a
go-around later in the process (Algorithm 1 Lines 8-12). If the aircraft goes
under 200 ft AGL, then it is determined to be on the final approach. The
aircraft is considered to be on the final approach while it is within 1 mile away
from the airport and it is between 50 and 200 feet AGL inclusive (Algorithm 1
Lines 16-22).
Once the aircraft either goes above 200 feet AGL or goes below 50 feet AGL,
then the final approach is marked as finished, and the critical metadata
associated with the approach is stored. At this point, the runway that is being
approached can be detected using a combination of the aircraft’s current
geolocation and heading since the intended runway may not be closest to the
aircraft depending on the degree of the final turn (Algorithm 1 Line 24).
Airport detection.
For identifying the airport that is being approached, a QuadTree [32] data
structure was used. It was used due to the fact that a two-dimensional tree
structure is needed in order to e ciently find the closest airport latitude and
longitude point when given the aircraft’s latitude and longitude. The QuadTree
12





4: heightAGL airplaneAltitude  airport.altitude
5: distance airplanePoint.distanceTo(airport.geoPoint)
6: if distance < 1mi and heightAGL < 500 ft then
7: apprID genNewApproachID()
8: while 200 ft < heightAGL < 500 ft and i < data.length do
9: airplaneAltitude data[i].altitude
10: heightAGL  airplaneAltitude   airport.altitude










20: heightAGL airplaneAltitude  airport.altitude
21: i i+ 1
22: end while
23: approachEndTime i
24: runway detectRunway(airplanePoint, airplaneHdg, airport)
25: approaches[apprID]  store approach metadata
26: return (approachStartTime, approachEndTime)
27: end if
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is constructed using a list of airport objects from a database then is optimized.
Both the insertion and searching algorithms yield O(log n) complexity.
Runway detection.
The algorithm used for finding the runway that is being approached is a
simple sequential search with a constraint that the di↵erence between the
aircraft’s heading and the runway’s heading must be within an upper limit. The
reasoning for this constraint is the fact that the runway closest to the aircraft
may not necessarily be the one it is approaching depending on the arrangement
of the runways and the degree of the final turn (see Figure 4). A value of 20  was
used for the heading constraint since it is double the value used for detecting a
heading exceedance (see Table 2). Thus if the runway returned by the algorithm
is not the intended runway, it means the aircraft’s heading is significantly
o↵-center from the runway’s heading and the pilot will need to perform severe
corrections to get back on course.
In this case, using a sequential search is e cient enough since an airport has a
very small number of runways, whereas there are thousands of airports within
the United States which requires a more sophisticated algorithm. The runway
detection algorithm is given in Algorithm 2.
Final turn detection.
In order to detect the final turn subphase of the approach, we first get the
previous three minutes of data before the approach ends. The previous three
minutes are used to reduce the search space and because it does not make logical
sense for a final turn to occur greater than three minutes before the approach
ends. Next, the algorithm searches for the final turn start and end time. It finds
these by searching for the points at which the aircraft’s heading creates a 90 
and 15  angle, respectively, to the runway’s heading. A visualization of these
reference points can be seen in Figure 5. The search is performed backwards
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Figure 4: Example showing that the closest runway to the aircraft may not nec-
essarily be the one they are attempting to land on. If we use the black dot as
a reference point for when we attempt to detect the runway, it can be seen that
the runway on the left may actually be closer. However, the aircraft’s heading
will match closer to the runway on the right (the pilot’s intended target). This is
the purpose of searching for the closest runway with a constraint on the heading
di↵erence.
Algorithm 2 Pseudo-code for detectRunway function which detects the runway
an aircraft is approaching.
1: function DetectRunway(airplanePoint, airplaneHdg, airport)
2: theRunway NULL
3: closestDistance 1
4: for runway in airport.runways do
5: if | headingDi↵erence(runway.hdg, airplaneHdg) |  20  then
6: distance airplanePoint.distanceTo(runway.geoPoint)













90 deg (turn start) 
15 deg (turn end)
Figure 5: Example showing the approach subphases and the slice of data used in
the final turn analysis. The dashed lines represent when the final turn starts (90 
heading di↵erence) and ends (15  heading di↵erence).
through the slice of data in order to obtain the last occurrence of each angle
di↵erence. Once both points have been found, they are stored for later use in the
analysis stage. If the aircraft did not have a heading di↵erence greater than 90 
in the final three minutes, the pilot performed a straight-in approach and,
consequently, did not execute the final turn subphase. The final turn detection
algorithm is given in Algorithm 3.
Landing
The landing phase is defined as the time from the beginning of the landing flare
until the aircraft performs one of the following actions: (i) exits the landing
runway, (ii) comes to a complete stop on the runway (full-stop), or (iii) when
power is applied for takeo↵ in the case of a touch-and-go landing [31].
The landing phase and result detection is able to di↵erentiate between a
full-stop, touch-and-go, and a go-around1. Pseudo-code for this process is given
1Go-around is included here as a possibility for the result of a landing phase since only one of
the full-stop, touch-and-go, and go-around maneuvers can be executed after an approach/landing
even though the aircraft does not physically contact the ground.
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Algorithm 3 Pseudo-code for function which detects the final turn subphase of
the approach.
1: function DetectFinalTurn(approachEndTime, runway)





7: i last3Mins.length  1
. Loop backwards through the last 3 mins of data
8: while not turnStartFound and not turnEndFound and i   0 do
9: headingError | headingDi↵erence(runway.hdg, last3Mins[i].hdg) |








18: i i  1
19: end while
20: approaches[apprID] store final turn metadata




This detection algorithm iterates through time values starting where the final
approach detection finished (Algorithm 4 Lines 10-29). It continues to iterate
while the aircraft is below 500 feet AGL; or if it is the aircraft’s final landing and
the time values run out, then it stops analyzing. While the algorithm iterates
through the time values, it checks if the aircraft’s indicated airspeed (IAS) is less
than or equal to 35 knots (Algorithm 4 Line 13). If this is true, then it is
determined the aircraft is no longer traveling at a flying speed, thus it is making
a complete stop. The stall speed of a Cessna 172S aircraft is 40 knots IAS
(KIAS) [1]; therefore, the value of 35 knots guarantees the aircraft cannot be
flying. In order to detect a touch-and-go landing, the previous five elevation
readings are stored and their average is calculated (Algorithm 4 Lines 20-28). If
it is found the aircraft is not making a stop-and-go landing, then the average
elevation for the last five seconds is checked to see if it is less than five feet AGL
(Algorithm 4 Line 15). This means the aircraft is still at a flying speed (above 35
knots) and is also maintaining a stable elevation of five feet or less for at least
five seconds.
Once the aircraft goes above 500 feet AGL or the time values run out, then
the landing result is determined from the conditions found during the analysis
(Algorithm 4 Line 32 and Algorithm 5). If it was found the aircraft was making
a complete stop, then a value of “full-stop” is stored. If it was not making a
complete stop and had a relatively stable elevation of 5 feet or less above the
runway, then a value of “touch-and-go” is stored. The final result type,
“go-around”, is used as a fall-through since there are only three classifications, as
mentioned previously. The three landing result types and how they are detected
are summarized in Table 1.
After the landing is classified, then it is determined whether there is a takeo↵
phase that follows the current landing phase. If the end of the data has been
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Table 1: Landing result types and their conditions.
Type Condition
full-stop
Aircraft’s indicated airspeed speed (IAS) falls below 35
knots
touch-and-go
Aircraft is not making a complete stop and maintains a
stable altitude of five feet AGL or less for at least five
seconds
go-around All other cases
reached or a go-around is being performed (Algorithm 4 Line 33), there will not
be a subsequent takeo↵ phase. Otherwise, we need to find the transition from
landing to takeo↵. This is done by finding the index of the engine’s minimum
RPM value between landingStartTime and landingEndTime (Algorithm 4 Line
36 and Algorithm 6). By using the engine’s minimum RPM value, we know all
RPM values afterwards will be greater, which means the pilot will be using more
throttle in order to takeo↵. The landingEndTime is then reset to this transition
mark. Lastly, the critical metadata found during the analysis is stored.
Phase of Flight Quality Analysis & Exceedance Detection
Approach
Along with analyzing the approach phase, this section also details the algorithms
for analyzing (i) the final turn subphase for an undershoot or overshoot and (ii)
the pilot’s self-defined glide path angle.
The algorithm for analyzing an approach phase iterates through all the time
values found during the phase identification stage (Algorithm 7 Lines 4-17). For
each time value, the analysis for unstableness is performed. During this analysis,
several flight parameters are checked against predetermined thresholds to see if
any were exceeded (Algorithm 7 Lines 8-11). The values used for the thresholds
are summarized in Table 2. A true value for a condition means the parameter is
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Algorithm 4 Pseudo-code for function which detects the landing from its asso-
ciated approach.








9: avg5SecElevation 5 ft + 1 . value to guarantee first check passes
10: while heightAGL < 500 ft and i < data.length do
11: if not isFullStop then
12: airplaneIAS data[i].ias
13: if airplaneIAS  35 kts then
14: isFullStop true




19: i i+ 1
20: airplaneAltitude data[i].altitude
21: heightAGL airplaneAltitude  runway.altitude









31: isEndOfData landingEndTime == data.length  1
32: landingResult getLandingResult(isFullStop, isTouchAndGo)
33: isFollowedByTakeo↵ not(isEndOfData or landingType == ‘go-around’)
. If landing is followed by a takeo↵, then we need to find the transition
from landing to takeo↵
34: if isFollowedByTakeo↵ then
35: landingDataSlice  get slice of data between landingStartTime and
landingEndTime




39: approaches[apprID] store landing metadata
40: return (landingStartTime, landingEndTime)
41: end function
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Algorithm 5 Pseudo-code for getLandingResult helper function.
1: function GetLandingResult(isFullStop, isTouchAndGo)
2: if isFullStop then
3: landingResult ‘full-stop’












5: while i < dataSlice.length do . loop through slice of data to find last
occurrence of minimum RPM







Table 2: Stabilized approach criteria for Cessna 172S [2].
Parameter Description Value
F Flight path correct
Less than 10  o↵ runway heading,
less than 50 ft left or right of the













S Sink rate appropriate
Vertical speed indicated (VSI)
does not exceed -1000 ft/min
stable. Thus, if any of the parameters are unstable, isUnstable will result to
being true, meaning the entire aircraft is in an unstable state (Algorithm 7 Line
12). If the aircraft is found to be unstable, the corresponding time value is stored
as well as the parameter values that caused the unstableness (Algorithm 7 Line
14).
Final turn.
The final turn subphase is very critical for achieving a flight path aligned with
the runway. Since the end of the turn occurs fairly late in the approach phase,
any mistakes can greatly reduce the pilot’s ability to stabilize the aircraft by 200
ft AGL. If the pilot makes a turn that is too sharp (undershoot) or too wide
(overshoot), they may have to make a large corrective maneuver to re-align
themselves, which could stall the aircraft if performed incorrectly and potentially
result in a loss of control (LOC) event. Stalls and loss of control events
contributed to 52.0% and 17.4% of all landing accidents in 2014 [6], respectively.
Analyzing this subphase only requires the end time value and runway found
during the identification stage. For this single time value, the aircraft’s cross
track error is calculated (Algorithm 8 Line 5). Next, the direction of the turn is
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Algorithm 7 Pseudo-code for function which analyzes an approach for unstable-
ness.
1: function AnalyzeApproach(startTime, endTime, runway)
2: approachDataSlice get slice of data between startTime and endTime
3: i 0





9: headingIsStable 180   | | runway.hdg  airplaneHdg |  180  |  20 
10: crossTrackIsStable calculateCrossTrack(
airplanePoint, airplaneHdg, runway)  50 ft
11: iasIsStable 55 kts  airplaneIAS  75 kts
12: vsiIsStable airplaneVSI    1000 ft/min
13: isUnstable not (headingIsStable and crossTrackIsStable and
iasIsStable and vsiIsStable)
14: if isUnstable then
15: approaches[apprID] store index as unstable and corresponding
unstable parameter values
16: end if
17: i i+ 1
18: end while
19: end function
determined by calculating which roll attitude direction was greater2 (Algorithm 8
Lines 6-12). The severity of the cross track error is then determined (Algorithm 8
Lines 13-19). A Risk Level 1 error is a value greater than 25 feet, while a Risk
Level 2 error is a value greater than 100 feet. The turn error is determined next
based on the roll direction and direction of the cross track error (Algorithm 8
Lines 20-32). For example, if the pilot rolled left and had a negative cross track
error3, it is considered an “undershoot”. See Table 3 for all possible
combinations of roll direction and cross track error. However, if the cross track
error is less than a Level 1 risk, then the turn is considered to be safe and a Risk
Level 0 is stored (Algorithm 8 Line 18). Lastly, the turn error and severity are
stored. See Figure 6 for visualizations of several di↵erent final turn scenarios.
2If the aircraft rolls to the left, it is recorded as a negative degree and vice versa if the aircraft
rolls to the right. This is why we find the minimum roll attitude as the highest degree in which
aircraft rolled left, and the maximum roll attitude as the highest degree in which the aircraft
rolled right.










Cross Track Error 
Turn
End
(b) Undershoot. In this
case, it is a small severity




Cross Track Error 
Turn
End
(c) Overshoot. In this
case, it is a large severity
(Level 2) and color-coded
as red.
Figure 6: Examples showing various final turn qualities.
Table 3: Final turn matrix of the combinations of roll direction and cross track error.
Direction
Cross Track
< 0 ft > 0 ft
Left Undershoot Overshoot
Right Overshoot Undershoot
If a final turn was not found in the detection phase (due to the pilot
performing a straight-in approach), the analysis stage will be skipped.
Self-defined glide path.
A majority of runways in the U.S. publish an ideal glide slope that all pilot’s
should adhere to. However, not all runways have a published glide slope.
Therefore, a method for analyzing the aircraft’s actual glide path angle (GPA)
during the final approach is needed in order for the pilot to be able to see what
their average GPA was and how well they adhered to it. This is why we termed
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Algorithm 8 Pseudo-code for function which analyzes the quality of a final turn
phase.
1: function AnalyzeFinalTurn(startTime, endTime, runway)





6: leftDirection |min(turnDataSlice[‘roll’]) |
7: rightDirection |max(turnDataSlice[‘roll’]) |





13: if | crossTrackError | > 100 ft then . Level 2
14: severity 2





20: if rollDirection == ‘left’ then












33: approaches[apprID] store severity and error
34: return (severity, turnError)
35: end function
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this method a “self-defined glide path angle”. Figure 7 shows an example of
what the self-defined glide path analysis is performing.
Major deviations from the ideal glide slope can be very costly. For example, if
the pilot is approaching at a steep angle, a hard landing or a landing short of the
runway can occur. On the other hand, if the pilot is approaching at a shallow
angle, a runway overrun can occur.
First, the slice of data for the corresponding approach phase found during the
detection stage is obtained (Algorithm 9 Line 2). Next, a linear regression using
the least squares approach is calculated (Algorithm 9 Line 3) using the aircraft’s
height AGL (dependent variable) over all the time values (independent variable).
From that calculation we obtain the y-intercept, slope, and r-value (correlation
coe cient) of the linear regression model (Algorithm 9 Lines 4, 5, 15). Then, all
the necessary values for computing the pilot’s defined GPA are calculated
(Algorithm 9 Lines 6-13). Once all the supporting values are found, then the
actual GPA is calculated using the arctan of the predicted vertical distance
dropped over the traveled horizontal distance (Algorithm 9 Line 14).
Furthermore, the square of the r-value is calculated (Algorithm 9 Line 16), which
explains how well the pilot’s glide path “fit” the ideal glide path. Lastly, the
calculated values and metadata are stored in the database.
Grading Metrics
When creating the risk level metrics to be used for grading the approach analysis
data, we wanted to ensure they were backed by statistics obtained from the
results from the sample set of flights. Towards that goal, the risk level metrics
have been created from the data found during the approach quality analysis. For
each parameter of concern, the recorded values across all approach phases in the










Figure 7: Example showing the self-defined glide path angle analysis. This shows
a side view of the pilot oscillating about the glide slope during the approach phase.
The calculation uses a linear regression of the aircraft’s vertical distance over time
fitted using the least squares approach. The solid line is the aircraft’s actual glide
path while the dotted line is the ideal glide path.
density of each value range. From these histograms, the mean and standard
deviation were calculated in order to create a best-fit line to overlay the
histogram. The charts were then analyzed by an aviation statistics expert at the
University of North Dakota who gave his opinion on reasonable values to use for
Risk Level 1 and 2 value ranges based on each mean, standard deviation, and
best-fit line. Even though those elements were created from the analysis
statistics, the aviation expert wanted to also ensure the safe value ranges (Risk
Level 0) did not conflict with the values published in UND’s standardization
manual [2] and the Cessna C172S Pilot’s Operating Handbook (POH) [1].
After the risk level metrics have been established, the approach quality
analysis results will be re-processed and graded according to the metrics. The
resulting grade is then stored along with the other generated approach analysis
data within the database. The specific details of the grading results from using
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Algorithm 9 Pseudo-code for function which analyzes the quality of the aircraft’s
glide path angle during the approach phase.
1: function AnalyzeGlidePath(startTime, endTime, runway)











11: predictedMaxAGL slope ⇤maxTime+ yIntercept
12: predictedMinAGL slope ⇤minTime+ yIntercept




16: rSquared pearsonsR ⇤ pearsonsR
17: approaches[apprID] store self-defined glide path metadata
18: return (actualGlidePathAngle, rSquared)
19: end function
the risk level metrics will be discussed further in Chapter 5.
Web Interfaces
This Section details the newly developed web pages for the NGAFID, which
dynamically display results based on the user’s chosen filters. At the time of this
writing, there have been new tools developed for each of the approach, final turn,
and self-defined glide path analyses. Each tool will be discussed further in the
subsequent Subsections.
Approach
A new web page was implemented in the NGAFID for the purpose of
dynamically displaying the approach analysis results produced by the Critical
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Figure 8: A screenshot of the Approach analysis tool on the NGAFID. It is showing
the histogram for indicated airspeed error with two date range filters: 2015-01-01
to 2015-12-31 and 2016-01-01 to 2016-12-31. The frequency of exceedances can be
seen with all values that fall outside of the 55-75 knots range.
Phase Analysis Tool to users (Figure 8). The results are given in four tabs, one
for each parameter, as histograms over a specified date range. A user is able to
dynamically add additional date ranges, which will create an additional series in
the chart for comparison. This feature can be used to detect changes in trends
over time. A user is also, optionally, able to filter the results to an airport and
further filter to a single runway. This will allow users to identify trends that are
potentially occurring at a specific runway but not at any other runways.
Final Turn
The tool developed for analyzing final turn phases in the NGAFID was
implemented with two modes: (i) “Single Flight” and (ii) “Aggregate”.
For the “Single Flight” mode, the user can input an ID for a specific flight
they’d like to analyze (Figure 9). Once the user clicks the “Display Single
Flight” button, the interactive map then dynamically transitions to the first
approach for that flight. The map will only display one approach at a time;
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although, there are tabs across the top for each approach which the user can
choose. Once a di↵erent tab is chosen, the map automatically transitions the
view to that corresponding approach. The flight path shows di↵erent color
codings for the separate final turn, approach, and landing phases as well as
di↵erent colors for the final turn specifically depending on the severity of the
turn error. A Level 1 turn error will be colored yellow, while a Level 2 turn error
will be colored red. If the turn error is less than the Level 1 criteria, it is colored
green. The user is also able to download a PNG screenshot of the map by
clicking the “Download PNG” button.
For the “Aggregate” mode; the user can choose a specific airport, runway, and
month and year combination; which will then display all the approaches that
occurred at the chosen runway during the chosen time-frame (Figure 10). This
mode allows a user to see trends in final turn phases during a given time span.
This mode displays the same color code scheme as the “Single Flight” mode.
Self-Defined Glide Path
The tool implemented in the NGAFID for displaying the results of the
self-defined glide path analysis currently only supports an aggregate mode
(Figure 11). It works similarly to the final turn tool as the user chooses an
airport, runway, and month and year combination. This will then display a
sideways histogram of all the approaches at the given runway during the given
time-frame. The y-axis shows glide path angles from 0  to 10  in 0.5 
increments, and the x-axis shows the number of occurrences that fell within each
angle bin. Lastly, the user can download an image of the displayed chart by
clicking the “hamburger” menu button.
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Figure 9: A screenshot of the Final Turn analysis tool on the NGAFID in “Sin-
gle Flight” mode. It is currently showing approach #1 for Flight ID #381001.
Approach #1 shown here had a Level 1 (yellow color code) undershoot.
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Figure 10: A screenshot of the Final Turn analysis tool on the NGAFID in “Ag-
gregate” mode. It is currently showing all approaches at the Warren Municipal
Airport (KD37) for Runway 12 during the month of January 2015. The many red
and yellow lines coming in from the left side mean that a majority of the turns
were Level 1 & 2 undershoots.
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Figure 11: A screenshot of the Self-Defined Approach analysis tool on the
NGAFID. It is currently showing all approaches at the Grand Forks International
Airport (KGFK) for Runway 35L during the month of November 2017. It dis-
plays a sideways histogram with glide path angles on the y-axis and the number




Programming Languages and Libraries
The Python programming language was used for implementing the flight analysis
due to its ease of use, its reputable scientific and graphing libraries, and the
ability to quickly produce a viable application. The libraries utilized are
MySQLdb1 for interacting with the MySQL database; matplotlib2 for graphing
flight parameters in the early stages of the application; NumPy3, Scipy4, and
Pandas5 for their scientific and vectorized functions; and the geodesy scripts
created by Chris Veness6. All source code is available at
https://github.com/KeltonKarboviak/NGAFID.
For the back-end of the web interface, Laravel7 was used as the PHP
framework. For the front-end, the following technologies were used: jQuery8 &
jQuery UI9, Bootstrap10 for CSS styling, OpenLayers11 for creating an
interactive map, OpenStreetMap12 for the images used by OpenLayers, and

















All experiments were performed on a 2013 Mac Pro running macOS 10.11.6 with
a 3.5 GHz 6 hyper-threaded core Intel Xeon E5 processor (for a total of 12 logical
processing cores). The machine also has 32 GBs of 1866 MHz DDR3 ECC RAM.
Parallelization
The application was originally created to process the flight data in a linear
fashion. This proved to be fairly time consuming when running the application
in batch mode with the significant number of flights contained in the NGAFID.
In order to improve the performance and e ciency of the application, Python’s
built-in multiprocessing module was used. The parallel application uses the
Producer-Consumer model in which the parent process acts at the Producer by
enqueuing all of the unique flight identifiers onto a queue and the child
subprocesses act as the Consumers by dequeuing a flight identifier then
processing it. The multiprocessing module was chosen over the built-in threading
module due to the issue with Python’s Global Interpreter Lock (GIL) e↵ectively
restricting bytecode execution to a single core [33]. This makes the threading






The experiments were run using Cessna 172S flight data produced by students at
the University of North Dakota during the month of September 2015. Student
flight data is ideal for unstable analysis testing as it contains very noisy data,
which provides a diverse array of flying patterns. A random sample of 100 flights
was chosen for the experiments.
First, the application was run against the 100 flights to obtain the automated
analysis results. The same 100 flights were then manually analyzed in order to
get human results for the phase identification, which could be compared to the
automated results then determine the accuracy of the application. The test of
the 100 flights was also run ten times each with the single-process version and
the multi-process version as previously described. This was done in order to
compare and contrast the performance of the separate versions.
Accuracy of Phase Identification
The manual validation was performed using a combination of tools available on
the NGAFID website: the Cesium flight reanimation tool and the Keyhole
Markup Language (KML) generator to visualize the flight path in Google
Earth [34] (see Figure 12).
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Figure 12: Example of using a KML file to visualize a flight path in Google Earth.
This flight visualization is an example of a student flight that has multiple ap-
proach phases.
Approach
The Critical Phase Analysis Tool generated a total of 380 approaches for the 100
flights that were tested. As seen in Figure 12, student flights typically consist of
multiple approaches as this is something that needs to be practiced. Out of the
total; there are 373 (98.16%) true positives, five (1.32%) false positives, and two
(0.53%) false negatives. These results can also be found in Figure 13.
In the context of this application, a true positive is a case where the tool
correctly indicates that an approach is occurring during a specified time frame.
A false positive occurs when the tool indicates that an approach is occurring
but is not in reality. Typically, a false positive occurs when the flight data has
invalid values for about the first ten rows, which then throws o↵ the beginning of
the algorithms. This happens infrequently, but could be accounted for in a
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future work by sanitizing the data before analysis.
A false negative is the exact opposite where the tool indicates that an
approach is not occurring but it is in reality. Typically, a false negative occurs
when the approached runway’s geological data is not contained within the
database. These types of occurrences should stop once the airport and runway
databases are expanded with more entries.
The tool misclassified the approached runway 13 times (3.42%). A runway is
misclassified when the di↵erence between the aircraft and runway headings is
greater than 20 . This occurs during the runway detection portion of the
approach analysis algorithm, and the algorithm either returns a null runway or
an incorrect runway due to the large heading di↵erence. Lastly, there was a total
of 42 (11.05%) approaches that were given a null runway. This number overlaps
with some of the 13 misclassifications, while the rest are due to a lack of runway
information as mentioned previously.
In this same context, it is di cult to quantify the number of true negatives
since these would be cases where the tool correctly indicates that an approach is
not occurring. The di culty lies in how to define a single occurrence. Should a
single true negative be counted for every second the tool indicates that an
approach is not occurring? If so, then this would create a numerous amount of
true negatives and would dilute the percentages of the other statistics, which are
more important in this application.
The validation results demonstrate that the Critical Phase Analysis Tool is
exceptionally accurate in its ability to appropriately detect and classify most
approaches in a flight.
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Figure 13: Pie chart showing the manual validation results including true positives,
false positives, and false negatives.
Quality Analysis
Approach
The results of the application have provided many possibilities for statistical
analysis since numerous statistics can be calculated from the generated approach
data. This can be seen in Figures 14a to 14d in which a sample of the possible
results were calculated from the experiments of the 100 flights used in this
research. With these various results, trends can be found in the data that has
been analyzed. For example, we can see in Figure 14a that out of the 380
approaches in the sample data, 57.11% (217) were stable and 42.89% (163) were
unstable. By drilling down into that data, we can see the frequency for each of
the landing types for stable and unstable approaches. Figure 14b depicts this
more detailed information and shows that full-stop landings occur most
frequently for both stable and unstable approaches. This result is not very
surprising for stable approaches; however, it is very undesirable for unstable
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approaches. If we look even further into the proportions for unstable approaches
alone (Figure 14c), we see that an unstable approach resulted in a go-around
only 34.97% of the time. This is far lower than the hopeful 100%, but was
expected to be approximately 20% by our aviation safety experts. As mentioned
previously, this is largely due to pilot misjudgment since all the analyzed flights
were piloted by aviation students; meaning they are still learning and are not yet
professionals.
When looking at the unstable approaches and the parameters that caused
them (Figure 14d), additional interesting results can be found. We found the
parameter that was exceeded the most was heading with 91 occurrences.
Heading was not predicted to be the leading cause of unstable approaches, but
our safety experts believe the 10  threshold (as defined in Table 2) may be too
strict. Indicated airspeed was the second highest, but was predicted to be the
leading cause since it was stated by our aviation safety experts to be a trend for
UND’s student pilots to be going too fast on final approaches.
Another interesting set of statistics that can be drawn from the analysis are
parameter value frequencies. Creating histograms of the values for each
parameter during all approach phases can show the values that occur most
frequently (highest density). Figures 15a to 15d visualize these histograms and
give the corresponding mean and standard deviation values. These graphs are
able to show how well pilots are adhering to the published stabilized approach
criteria (see Table 2). As mentioned previously, the standard deviations will be
used in defining the grading metrics and will be discussed in more detail later in
this Chapter.
Final turn.
Out of the 380 detected approaches; 262 (68.95%) had a final turn subphase,
76 (20.00%) performed a straight-in approach, and 42 (11.05%) were not able to
detect the runway and, therefore, could not detect whether a final turn was
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(a) Pie chart showing the number of sta-
ble approaches compared to the number
of unstable approaches.
(b) Frequency of the occurrences of each
landing type for stable and unstable ap-
proaches.
(c) Pie chart comparing the number of
occurrences for each landing type after
an unstable approach.
(d) Frequency of parameters that caused
an aircraft to be unstable during an ap-
proach. Note that a single approach
can have multiple unstable parameters,
which causes the sum of the occurrences
to not equal the total number of unsta-
ble approaches.
Figure 14: Sample set of the statistics and trends that can be found from the
automated analysis results.
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(a) Indicated airspeed. (b) Vertical speed indicated.
(c) Cross track error. (d) Heading error.
Figure 15: Histograms showing the frequencies of values for each parameter during
all approach phases. Each graph also has a dotted best-fit line to show how close
the frequencies adhere to a normal distribution.
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Figure 16: Pie chart showing the results from the final turn detection algorithm.
performed. Figure 16 depicts these ratios. As mentioned earlier, the 42 null
runways will be drastically reduced in the future once additional airports and
runways are added to the geological database. Once the airport and runway
databases are more complete, the runway error rate should become much more
acceptable.
Figure 17 gives a comparison of the number of occurrences for each turn error
type and Risk Level classification. This graph is displaying the subset of 262
detected final turn subphases found in Figure 16. The figure shows that 76.34%
of the final turns resulted in an undershoot and a large proportion (45.42%)
resulted in a Risk Level 2 undershoot. Those statistics are definitely interesting
and are an example of an anomaly that is worth looking into by an aviation
expert. One explanation could be that there is frequently a strong wind
component against the aircraft, which could cause the numerous undershoots.
Further analysis such as this could be performed as a future work since wind and
other meteorological factors were not taken into consideration in the analyses
within this research.
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Figure 17: Frequency of the occurrences of each turn error type for Risk Levels 0,
1, and 2.
Grading Metrics: Defined From Parameter Frequencies
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the goal for creating the Risk Level metrics is to use
statistical results from the approach quality analysis to determine reasonable
values that still adhere to the published stable value ranges. Figures 15a to 15d
above contain normalized histograms showing the probability density for the
parameter values. These graphs were analyzed by an aviation statistics expert
from UND in order to create a safe range (Risk Level 0), a moderate risk range
(Risk Level 1), and a high risk range (Risk Level 2) for each parameter of
concern. These graphs will be re-used in the following Sections, but will have
additional information showing the value ranges that were created. The Risk
Level 1 values will be a yellow dotted line, while the Risk Level 2 values will be a
red dotted line. A summary of the defined grading metrics can be seen in
Table 4 at the end of this Section.
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Figure 18: Histogram for indicated airspeed (µ = 64.401,   = 4.535). The safe
range is between 61 and 66 knots. The aviation expert stated that 61 knots is a
hard limit according to the Cessna 172S manual [1], thus any airspeed less than
61 knots is automatically classified as a Risk Level 2. This means there is not a
lower Risk Level 1. The higher Risk Level 1 range is between 66 and 71 knots,
and the Risk Level 2 is anything greater than 71 knots.
Indicated Airspeed Between 55 and 75 knots
The indicated airspeed values had a mean of 64.401 knots and a standard
deviation of 4.535 knots. The aviation expert stated that the UND
standardization manual [2] has a strict safe range of 61 -0/+5 knots, and thus
anything less than 61 knots should be automatically classified as a Risk Level 2.
He advised the higher Risk Level 1 should begin with any value greater than 66
knots due to the same rule. Lastly, he advised setting the higher Risk Level 2 at
71 knots in order to use the consistent 5 knots increment, which is also relatively
close to one standard deviation. As is shown in Figure 18, the graph is slightly
skewed to the right following the -0/+5 knots rule, which is more lenient towards
faster speeds than slower speeds.
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Vertical Speed Indicated Greater Than -1000 ft/min
The vertical speed indicated values had a mean of -364.528 ft/min and a
standard deviation of 181.210 ft/min. Although the UND standardization
manual states that a vertical speed greater than -1000 ft/min should be achieved
for a stabilized approach, the aviation expert stated that a safe range of -800 to
-500 ft/min is typically suggested instead of the wide range provided in the
manual. The lower Risk Level 1 is any value that is less than -800 ft/min, and
the lower Risk Level 2 is any value less than -1000 ft/min in order to adhere to
the stable limit given in the manual. The higher Risk Level 1 is any value
greater than -500 ft/min, and the higher Risk Level 2 is any value greater than
-250 ft/min. These higher limits were chosen because if the aircraft is descending
at 250 ft/min, it will typically result in an unsafe and shallow glide slope.
Figure 19 shows these limits and shows that the values are slightly skewed to the
left, which corresponds to the risk limits that we’ve set.
Absolute Cross Track Error Less Than 50 ft
The cross track error values had a mean of -4.542 feet and a standard deviation
of 15.499 feet. Figure 20 displays the histogram for these values and it can be
seen that the graph is relatively normal with a slight skew to the left. The
aviation expert stated that a deviation in cross track error is not as risky as a
deviation in airspeed or vertical speed. Thus, a wider safe range was defined as
-40 feet to 40 feet, which is about where the tails wane on both sides.
Consequently, the lower and higher Risk Level 1 ranges are -50 feet to -40 feet
and 40 feet to 50 feet, respectively. The lower and higher Risk Level 2 values are
then -50 feet and 50 feet, respectively, in order to correspond with the original
stable limits that were used.
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Figure 19: Histogram for vertical speed indicated (µ =  364.528,   = 181.210).
The safe range is between -800 and -500 ft/min. The lower Risk Level 1 range is
between -1000 and -800 ft/min, and the Risk Level 2 is anything less than -1000
ft/min. The higher Risk Level 1 range is between -500 and -250 ft/min, and the
Risk Level 2 is anything greater than -250 ft/min.
Absolute Heading Error Less Than 10 degrees
The heading error values had a mean of 1.958  and a standard deviation of
4.761 . Similar to cross track error, the aviation expert stated that heading error
is not as risky as error in the other parameters. He also mentioned that heading
error is slightly more di cult to judge without knowing the wind component on
the aircraft since the pilot may have to purposely direct the aircraft several
degrees o↵-center in order to counteract the push of the wind. Both of these
facts means that the safe range for heading error will contain a majority of
values. With that said, the expert advised using a safe range of  15  to 15 .
The lower and higher Risk Level 1 ranges are from  20  to  15  and 15  to 20 ,
respectively. Consequently, the lower and higher Risk Level 2 values are  20 
and 20 , respectively. The histogram for heading error, as shown in Figure 21,
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Figure 20: Histogram for cross track error (µ =  4.542,   = 15.499). The safe
range is between -40 and 40 ft. The lower Risk Level 1 range is between -50 and
-40 ft, and the Risk Level 2 is anything less than -50 ft. The higher Risk Level 1
range is between 40 and 50 ft, and the Risk Level 2 is anything greater than 50 ft.
appears to best fit a normal distribution.
Grading Metrics: Experiment Results
Using the metrics defined in the previous Section, the sample set of flights was
re-analyzed in order to determine the risk levels of each parameter for every
approach. This was done by taking all the values for a parameter during the
approach phase, averaging the values, and determining what risk level range the
average fell within. Figure 22 shows the frequency of each parameter grouped by
risk level as a result of the re-analysis. From the graph we can see some trends
such as the frequency of Risk Level 2 vertical speeds being abnormally higher
than the frequency of Risk Level 1. This may mean that the sample set
contained an abnormal number of approaches with too low or too high rate of
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Figure 21: Histogram for heading error (µ = 1.958,   = 4.761). The safe range is
between -15 and 15 degrees. The lower Risk Level 1 range is between -20 and -15
degrees, and the Risk Level 2 is anything less than -20 degrees. The higher Risk
Level 1 is between 15 and 20 degrees, and the Risk Level 2 is anything greater
than 20 degrees.
Table 4: Defined Risk Levels during approach for a Cessna C172S
Event Risk Level 1 Risk Level 2
Indicated airspeed
low N.A. 61 knots
high 66 knots 71 knots
Vertical speed
low -800 ft/min -1000 ft/min
high -500 ft/min -250 ft/min
Cross track error
low -40 ft -50 ft





Figure 22: Frequency of the occurrences of each parameter for Risk Levels 0, 1,
and 2 using the newly defined risk level values.
descent. We can also see that Risk Level 0 made up a majority of occurrences for
heading and cross track, which follows the fact that these parameters are
typically less risky as mentioned in their previous corresponding Subsections.
With regard to grading the approaches, the total number of deductions is
calculated by summing the risk levels across all parameters as well as the final
turn risk level. For example; if during an approach the aircraft achieved a Risk
Level 2 in indicated airspeed, a Risk Level 1 in vertical speed, a Risk Level 1
undershoot for the final turn, and a Risk Level 0 for all other parameters; the
total number of deductions is 41. Additionally, if the aircraft was unstable
during the approach and the pilot did not perform a go-around, an additional
one deduction is added to the total. The total number of deductions is then
12 (IAS) + 1 (VSI) + 1 (final turn) + 0 (cross track) + 0 (heading) = 4 deductions
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Figure 23: Histogram showing the results of grading approach phases. Each grade
is calculated by totaling the risk levels across all parameters then multiplying the
sum by a penalty amount per deduction.
multiplied by a penalty constant. The penalty points are subtracted from a total
of 100 points in order to obtain the final grade for the approach. In this research,
a value of 4 points is used as the penalty per deduction. This value was chosen
because there is a possibility of accruing 11 total deductions2, which would
create a total of 44 penalty points. Thus, the worst possible grade to receive
would be 56 points3. Figure 23 gives a histogram of the grades calculated for the
sample set of 100 flights used during the experiments. For the grades of the
sample set, the mean was 87.168 points and a standard deviation of 7.260 points.
As the figure shows, the histogram reasonably fits a normal distribution, but
slightly skewed to the right. These results have given us good confidence that
the grading system will replicate the grading structure already used in
Universities that students are already accustomed to.
22 risk levels * 4 parameters + 2 final turn risk levels + 1 for unstable w/o go-around = 11
3If using a 90-80-70-60% grading scale, this would then correspond to an F.
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Performance
A secondary aspect of this research is to minimize the execution time so the
analysis only adds a minimal amount of time to a flight being imported into the
NGAFID system. The results of the benchmarking tests showed that the linearly
executing application ran for an average of 127.109 seconds over the 100
randomly tested flights. On the other hand, the parallel application ran for an
average of 56.935 seconds over the same flights. This means the average
per-flight execution times for the linear and parallel applications were 1.271 and
0.569 seconds, respectively. As a result, the parallelized application had a 2.23x
speedup, which is fairly significant. A summary of the benchmarking tests and
other relevant statistics are given in Table 5.
As further evidence, the parallel application was tested on a larger subset of
flights to see if the average execution time remained stable, in which it was
tested on 5,923 flights. For this test, the parallel application was able to analyze
the data and insert all the results into the database in 2,709.577 seconds. This
gives a per-flight execution time of 0.457 seconds, which is slightly less than the
average for 100 flights. The reasoning behind this can most likely be attributed
to the fact that spinning up the sub-processes creates a substantial overhead.
Thus, the longer the application is able to execute, the greater performance gain
will be received. This will, of course, start to show diminishing returns as with
any other parallel computing application.
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Table 5: Performance of Linear v. Parallel Execution Times

















This thesis presented the Critical Phase Analysis Tool, an application
designed to augment the existing features of the National General Aviation
Flight Information Database (NGAFID). The purpose of creating the application
is to provide student pilots and Certified Flight Instructors (CFI) with
metrics-based feedback on flight performance during critical phases of flight. The
desired e↵ects of this are (i) target di↵erent student learning techniques, (ii)
improve the e ciency and reduce the cost of flight training, and (iii) reduce
General Aviation (GA) accident and fatality rates since GA is the most
dangerous branch of Civil Aviation. Additionally, the application is currently
geared towards analyzing the approach and landing phases as these phases of
flight are where a majority of pilot-related accidents occur.
Using flight data recorder (FDR) data generated by a Garmin G1000 from
Cessna C172S aircraft; the application can detect safety exceedances for
indicated airspeed, vertical speed, cross track, and heading during the approach
phase as well as classify the result of each approach as a full-stop landing,
touch-and-go landing, or a go-around during the landing phase. For the
event-driven approach to successfully characterize the safety of an approach, the
safety exceedance definitions needed to be internally consistent (i.e., the
parameter limits need to correspond to the same level of risk to the pilot). In
this research, the safety exceedances were re-defined in a way that makes them
more consistent by an aviation statistics expert who used the distributions of
parameter values found during the initial experiments. These new definitions
were then used in the newly created grading system for the purpose of scoring
the pilot’s flight performance based on any exceedances found during the
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approach analysis stage.
Several new web tools were created which were integrated into the NGAFID.
These tools include interfaces for (i) displaying histograms of the aggregated
parameter values during approach phases within a chosen time-frame, (ii)
visualizing final turn phases for a single flight or an aggregate of flights at a
chosen runway, and (iii) displaying a histogram of self-defined glide path angles
within a chosen time-frame at a given runway.
The performance of the application run in parallel averaged 0.569 seconds per
flight for the sample set of 100 flights, while an analysis of 5,923 flights averaged
0.457 seconds per flight. This shows that the application has a reasonably short
run-time and can be used practically in the NGAFID’s production environment.
Future Work
This research has provided many avenues for further work and refinement. First,
the greatest constraint on the accuracy of the application is the accuracy of the
instrument recording the flight data, whether that be a traditional FDR or a
smartphone. This means that if data is recorded inaccurately, it is useless to the
application and cannot be recovered. For example, in several of the sample
flights, the first 10 to 20 rows of data can have missing and/or spurious values
due to the aircraft’s sensors calibrating after first starting the FDR. Invalid data
rows can occur during the middle of a flight as well; not only when the FDR is
initially turned on. Thus, further work into filtering, sanitizing, or normalizing
faulty data would be very beneficial.
Second, it would be beneficial to make the algorithms more modular in order
to analyze data from di↵erent sources. For example, a source with a limited
number of parameters it records, such as a smartphone, or a completely di↵erent
FDR brand.
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Third, this research focused solely on the analysis of flight performance and
generation of metrics describing the performance, thus further work in the area
of UI/UX would be a great next step. This future research would ideally focus
on the most e↵ective way to display the metrics to the user and improve upon
the user-friendliness of the web interfaces introduced in this work.
Lastly, the algorithms introduced in this research can be extended to analyze
other phases of flight (e.g., takeo↵, climb, cruise, etc.). This means that new risk
level values would need to be defined as well to fit the data found in the new
analyses.
Once the Critical Phase Analysis Tool is fully integrated into the NGAFID, it
will provide even more possibilities for data visualization and be easily accessible
for both novice and experienced pilots. This will allow pilots on an individual or
organizational level to become more aware of bad flight habits so they may
correct them in future flights and help make General Aviation safer.
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